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BOOK REVIEW SYMPOSIUM
CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD:
AN INTRODUCTION
ROBERT K. VISCHERt
Americans justifiably cherish the liberty of conscience as an
essential limitation on state power, but our longstanding
commitment to conscience has proven to be little help in
resolving an expanding range of conscience claims. Increasingly,
the individual who invokes conscience is opposed not by the state
but by the similarly conscience-driven claims of other individuals
and groups. As a bulwark against state power, a robust right of
conscience is indispensable. As a trump card that empowers
individuals to shut down the moral claims of other marketplace
actors, a right of conscience becomes significantly more
problematic.
Consider the case of Elane Photography, a flash point in the
emerging battle over conscience that erupted from a simple email
exchange.' Vanessa Willock contacted Elane Photography, a
husband-and-wife photo agency in Albuquerque, New Mexico, to
inquire about photographing her same-sex commitment
ceremony. Co-owner Elaine Huguenin emailed back: "We do not
photograph same-sex weddings. But thanks for checking out our
I Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of St.
Thomas Law School (Minnesota). This Essay is taken in significant part from
ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE
BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE (2010). The Essay was presented in conjunction with a
panel discussion of the book held in November 2009 at the University of Notre Dame
as part of the Center for Ethics and Culture's annual fall conference.
Willock v. Elane Photography, LLC, No. 06-12-20-0685 (N.M. Hum. Rts.
Commission Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://volokh.com/files/willockopinion.pdf,
affd, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. D-202-CV-200806632 (N.M. Dist. Ct.
Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://www.telladf.org/userdocs/ElanePhotoOrder.pdf.
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site!"2  Willock filed a complaint with the state human rights
commission, alleging a violation of the state's public
accommodations law, which covers sexual orientation. At the
hearing, Willock testified that the email "was a shock" and
caused her "anger and fear."' Jonathan Huguenin explained at
the hearing that they made sure that "everything that we
photographed-everything we used our artistic ability for"-was
in line with their Christian values.4 The commission rejected the
photographers' constitutional claims, found that they unlawfully
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, and ordered
them to pay attorney's fees of nearly $7,000 to Willock.
Unlike the conscience cases pitting the individual against
the state-for example, disputes over conscientious objectors to
the military draft' or Jehovah's Witness students forced to pledge
allegiance to the flag 6-both sides in the Elane Photography case
can wrap themselves in the mantle of conscience. Willock acted
on her belief in the moral legitimacy of same-sex relationships by
seeking to solemnize her commitment with the same celebratory
trappings that have long been part of traditional marriage
ceremonies. The Huguenins acted on their belief in the
immorality of same-sex relationships by refusing to participate in
the celebration of such a relationship. While Willock's critics
argue that liberty of conscience should not be interpreted as
empowering individuals to force others to assist their morally
contested projects, the Huguenins' critics argue that liberty of
conscience should not be interpreted as a license for marketplace
providers to define their professional duties so as to discriminate
against members of historically marginalized groups.
New Mexico law unjustifiably allowed Willock's conscience to
trump the Huguenins' consciences. Granting an unfettered right
of conscience to the Huguenins would have similarly cast
conscience as a trump card, a conversation-stopper. Under either
outcome, conflicting claims of conscience become winner-take-all
contests for state power. An observer could not be blamed for
concluding that the right of conscience is morphing from a
2 Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Gay Rights, Religious Liberties: A Three Act Story,




' See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 164-65 (1965).
6 See, e.g., W.V. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943).
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bulwark against government encroachment into a more broadly
enforceable right to individual autonomy.
To get a firmer grasp on conscience, we need to reclaim a
dimension of the term that is discernible from its earliest usage:
Conscience is a set of moral truth claims that can be shared with
others. Though the concept of conscience as shared knowledge
has often been lost amid the individualist clamor of American
"rights talk," it remains easy to discern. The dictates of
conscience are defined, articulated, and lived out in relationship
with others. Our consciences are shaped externally; our moral
convictions have sources, and our sense of self comes into relief
through interaction with others. By conveying my perception of
reality's normative implications, my conscience makes truth
claims that possess authority over conduct-both my own and
the conduct of those who share, or come to share, my perception.
Conscience, by its very nature, connects a person to something
bigger than herself, not only because we form our moral
convictions through interaction with the world around us, but
also because we invest those convictions with real-world
authority in ways that are accessible, if not agreeable, to others.
This is the relational dimension of conscience. My new book,
Conscience and the Common Good,' attempts to explain this
relational dimension and trace its implications for our most
pressing debates about conscience.
Put simply, my central claim is that, if our society is serious
about freedom of conscience, we must also be serious about
cultivating and maintaining the conditions necessary for morally
expressive and formative relationships to thrive. The problem
today is that the state, in Elane Photography8 and other cases,
pays insufficient heed to these relationships, effectively giving
the individual customer's conscience a trump over the provider's
conscience through the imposition of broad nondiscrimination
laws. Increasingly, such laws appear aimed not simply at
ensuring access to an essential good or service but at enshrining
ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE
SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE (2010).
Willock v. Elane Photography, LLC, No. 06-12-20-0685 (N.M. Hum. Rts.
Commission Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://volokh.com/files/willockopinion.pdf,
affd, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. D-202-CV-200806632 (N.M. Dist. Ct.
Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://www.telladf.org/userdocs/ElanePhotoOrder.pdf.
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nondiscrimination as a blanket requirement for providers'
participation in the marketplace.
Too often, however, the response of those concerned with the
erosion of providers' liberty is to champion the recognition of a
blanket right of conscience on their behalf. They ask the law to
immunize an individual provider's conscience-driven marketplace
conduct from state penalty or employer reprisal. If an individual
employee of a provider has the unfettered legal right to make her
own decisions about the morally contested goods and services she
will provide, it becomes more difficult for institutions to create
and maintain their own distinct moral identities.' A vibrant
liberty of conscience requires morally distinct institutions, not
just morally autonomous individuals.
Morally distinct photo agencies presume a degree of
institutional authority over dissenting employees. If individuals
are the only actors legally empowered to stake out distinct moral
identities, we are left with a morally homogenous landscape of
institutional providers, which in turn damages the cause of
conscience by making it more difficult for individuals to gather in
venues for the mutual formation, articulation, and living out of
shared moral commitments. Individualized conceptions of
conscience-whether espoused by the consumer or the provider-
do not hold much promise for resolving the new wave of
conscience battles because they overlook the relationships that
are key to conscience's long-term flourishing.
The state would more prudently support the liberty of
conscience by stepping back from the winner-take-all language of
rights talk and allowing Vanessa Willock and the Huguenins to
live out their convictions in the marketplace. Assuming that
other wedding photographers are willing and able to shoot a
same-sex commitment ceremony, the state should leave the
Huguenins to answer to the consumer, not the state, and allow
consumers to utilize market power to contest or embrace the
moral norms of their choosing. Rather than making all
photography agencies morally fungible via state edict, the
market allows the flourishing of plural moral norms in the
provision of these services. Individual consciences can thrive
through overlapping webs of morality-driven associations and
' See, e.g., Rob Stein, "Pro-Life" Drugstores Market Beliefs, WASH. POST, June
16, 2008, at Al (noting rise of pro-life pharmacies).
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allegiances, even while diametrically opposed consciences
similarly thrive. At the same time, if the Huguenins cannot find
market support for their agency's moral claims, they would not
have the right to force other agencies to hire them and
accommodate their claims of conscience. They should have the
freedom to create an economically viable agency with a distinct
moral identity; they should not have the authority to hinder the
cultivation of another agency's conflicting moral identity.
Wedding photographers, obviously, play a very small role in
today's conscience battles. Participants in an exploding array of
debates over the provision of goods and services in our society
tend to invoke conscience as a freestanding, absolute value
without acknowledging-much less articulating-the real-world
relationships and associational ties that empower individuals to
live out the dictates of conscience. Pharmacists in many states
have claimed a right of conscience to refuse to dispense any
pharmaceutical to which they object morally-typically
abortifacients, contraceptives, or anti-depressants-without fear
of losing their jobs. At the same time, pharmacy customers have
argued that their own rights of conscience entitle them to receive
any legal pharmaceutical at any licensed pharmacy "without
delay, without hassle and without a lecture." 0 Many states have
enshrined one side or the other's claim into their laws.
Consumer-provider conscience battles have also erupted, for
example, over a Christian physician's refusal to provide
reproductive assistance to a patient because she is not married"
and Muslim taxi drivers' refusal to transport passengers carrying
alcohol.12
Other legal challenges have taken aim more directly at an
organization's moral identity, particularly its religious identity,
based on perceived threats to the consciences of individual
employees or customers. E-Harmony, a leading dating website
founded by an evangelical Christian, was forced via litigation to
10 Press Release, State of Ill. Dep't of Fin, and Profl Regulation, Governor
Blagojevich Moves to Make Emergency Contraceptives Rule Permanent (Apr. 18,
2005) (quoted in http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1386987/posts).
n Benetiz v. N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, Inc., 131 CAL. 2d 364 (2003).
12 John Reinan, Taxi Proposal Gets Sharp Response, STAR TRIB. (Minn.) (Feb.
27, 2007 8:25 PM), http://www.startribune.com/local/11586646.html.
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begin offering matchmaking services for same-sex relationships. 13
In the same vein, state universities have revoked recognition of
Christian student groups that exclude non-Christians; 14 state
legislatures in California and New York have forced Catholic
Charities to cover the cost of contraceptives for employees;15 and
the Massachusetts legislature required Catholic Charities to
place children with same-sex couples as a condition of
maintaining its license to perform adoption services, leading to
the group's decision to terminate the services." The modern
inclination is to presume that the cause of conscience is
represented by the individuals whose own exercise of conscience
may be burdened by an organization's distinctive moral identity.
Little attention is paid to the conscience-facilitating function of
the organizations themselves.
The current trend stems, at least in part, from a failure to
distinguish the common good from the collective good.
References to "the common good" may have achieved a new
ubiquity in the 2008 presidential election," but their traces
stretch as far back as Aristotle. Today's invocations are often
unhelpfully vacuous, but Aristotle got to the heart of the matter
" Elizabeth Holmes, EHarmony's Same Sex Dating Site Launches, WALL. ST. J.
BLOGS (Mar. 31, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/03/31/eharmonys-
same-sex-dating-site-launches/.
4 See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006).
' See Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Superior Ct., 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004)
(upholding California law); Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859
N.E.2d 459, 7 N.Y.3d 510 (2006) (upholding New York law).
1 See Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2006, at Al.
17 See, e.g., Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Inauguration Address (Jan.
20, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/ ("The
success of our economy has always depended not just on the size of our gross
domestic product, but on the reach of our prosperity; on the ability to extend
opportunity to every willing heart-not out of charity, but because it is the surest
route to our common good."); Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Finishing Our Work,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A35 ("[Obama] will only succeed if he is able to
articulate a new politics of the common good.") (quoting Harvard professor Michael
Sandel) (internal quotation marks omitted); Jane Lampman, '08 Race Has Got
Religion. Is that good?, CHRISTIAN Scl. MON., May 28, 2008, at 1 ("The voters care
more about the common good than the culture wars.") (quoting Rev. Jennifer Butler
of Faith in Public Life, the group that sponsored the Compassion Forum debate
between presidential candidates); Jon Meachem, The Editor's Desk, NEWSWEEK,
Apr. 14, 2008, at 4 ("Politics being politics, big reforms requiring economic sacrifice
and devotion to the common good are not easy to accomplish. . . ."); Larry King Live
(CNN television broadcast Feb. 13, 2008) ("We are going to be able to win ... on an
appeal to the common good.") (remarks of Democratic strategist David Wilhelm).
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by linking social welfare with the possibility of conflicting
values-a nascent embrace of value pluralism. In contrast to
Plato, who attempted to eliminate potential grounds of conflict
such as private property and exclusive sexual relations, Aristotle
defended the importance of interpersonal bonds. In Martha
Nussbaum's words, Aristotle saw in the "good city" that the
"contingent conflict of values is . . . a condition of the richness
and vigor of civic life itself."18  Particular bonds and loyalties
among citizens provide civic life with "sources of motivation and
concern that could be found in no other way."1 Put simply,
"personal separateness" is "an essential ingredient of human
social goodness."20
The state, as society's only legitimate purveyor of coercive
force, must act with deference toward the dimension of the
common good that is not defined by the collective will. This is
why it is so important that the state recognize and respect the
rights needed to protect the human person from overbearing
state incursions on both individual and associational autonomy.
The state's self-restraint helps ensure that the common good is
not defined and imposed from above as either a uniform, fixed
norm or as an idiosyncratic product of office-holders' own moral
claims, but is instead realized from the bottom up, constituted by
the conscience-driven decisions and day-to-day actions of
individuals and the communities to which they belong.
The state's self-restraint cannot be absolute, of course, for
the common good requires a level of social justice and order that
only state authority can ensure. But the exercise of state
authority must be premised on a vision of society that is not
always apparent in today's debates about conscience. The liberty
of conscience presumes a meaningful degree of state self-
restraint.
Viewed from the perspective of the common good, state
deference to conscience does not simply represent a laissez-faire
judgment that individual liberty should be maximized for its own
sake. A robust liberty of conscience actually bolsters the type of
decentralized social bonding that has been lauded as a hallmark
of American life; there is a close relationship between social
8 MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN
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health and the maintenance of a robust web of nongovernmental,
freely chosen human associations known as "civil society."
Associations formed via the impetus of conscience possess an
independent normative authority, empowering citizens through a
shared sense of identity, purpose, and meaning to participate in
projects that are bigger than themselves.
My book's portrayal of the common good requires us to step
back from our dominant rights-driven political theory-today
shaped in significant part by the work of John Rawls 2 1-in which
persons are conceived of as "free and independent selves,
unencumbered by moral or civic ties they have not chosen."2 2 To
an extent, this entire book seeks to answer questions posed by
Michael Sandel in his own efforts to push back against rights-
oriented liberalism with insights gleaned from the republican
tradition: "How might our political discourse engage rather than
avoid the moral and religious convictions people bring to the
public realm? And how might the public life of a pluralist society
cultivate in citizens the expansive self-understandings that civic
engagement requires?"23 Sandel may not agree with all of my
conclusions, but we start with similar concerns, as do other
writers, such as Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, and Alasdair
MacIntyre, who frequently bear the "communitarian" label.24
Indeed, conscience's relational dimension can be understood as a
lens through which to bring our citizens' "expansive self-
understandings" into clearer focus. It is the self-transcendence of
our myriad moral claims that, when given social space to
flourish, contributes powerfully to the common good.
The relationship between the common good and the freedom
of associations does not seem to resonate as strongly in our
society as it once did. Exhibit A offered by advocates for more
aggressive state action in this area is the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which prohibits discrimination based on race, among other
21 See generally JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999); JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
22 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 6 (1996).
23 Id. at 7.
24 Challenging the depiction of a person as a "free and independent self" is a
common theme of these writers, but my engagement with their work does not rely on
the "communitarian" label, both because their work fits uneasily within any unified
characterization, and because they themselves have expressed discomfort with the
label.
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grounds, by employers and places of public accommodation,
including restaurants and hotels.2 5 If the relational dimension of
conscience demands that we allow individuals to express and live
out their moral convictions in the marketplace, permitting them
to appeal to like-minded citizens in an ongoing contest over the
common good, the Civil Rights Act is a troubling case. It can be
read as having short-circuited the "bottom up" conversation over
the good, imposing a collective vision of racial equality on public
and private actors alike.
Nevertheless, today the Civil Rights Act is rightfully praised
as a vital measure by which America's aspirational ideals became
more closely aligned with its reality, and its success has
emboldened subsequent advocates of social justice to embrace a
top-down approach to our nation's moral contests. Extrapolating
from the Jim Crow South to today's "culture war" landscape is
tricky business, though. Three questions are central to the
inquiry.
First, what is the cost of maintaining space in which
divergent claims of conscience can operate freely? If the
government proposes to shut down the moral marketplace and
enshrine one set of claims as binding law, there should have been
a deliberate judgment that the continued viability of the
dissenting claims exacts too great a cost on the common good.
For example, prohibiting discrimination in employment or
housing are vastly different propositions than prohibiting
discrimination by a Christian fraternity." A business owner
whose moral convictions lead him to employ only whites-
or men, heterosexuals, etcetera-threatens the excluded
individuals' ability to function in society by foreclosing economic
opportunity. While there is a job market, determining access to
employment is more difficult than determining access to goods
and services. It is relatively easy to determine the policy of every
pharmacy in town regarding the sale of the morning-after pill, for
example, and an individualized inquiry of the affected customer
is unnecessary. One can only speculate as to whether a job
25 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000e-2 (2006).
26 See Jon Sanders, Taste-Houses of Worship: The College Code, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 27, 2004, at W13 (reporting on the University of North Carolina's decision to
revoke recognition of a Christian fraternity for refusing to open membership to non-
Christians).
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applicant who was discriminated against by one employer would
have found comparable employment elsewhere, and the inquiry
will be highly individualized, encompassing many different
factors, including the applicant's qualifications and interests, the
overlap in timing between the applicant's search and available
openings, and the respective compensation and benefit packages
associated with those openings. Given the centrality of
employment to a person's ability to function in society and the
difficulty in implementing a nondiscrimination framework
triggered on access, the state is justified in enforcing
nondiscrimination norms against employers.27
There is also a housing market, but it is not enough that a
person has access to a house; for access to be meaningful, there
needs to be a meaningful choice of homes and locations.
Economic reality and covert discrimination already limit
meaningful access, but permitting overt discrimination could
quickly worsen the patterns of segregation that already consign
historically marginalized minorities to neighborhoods that
exacerbate their marginalization. As such, the state prudently
excludes certain marginalizing traits of prospective
tenants/buyers from the landlord/seller's legitimate
consideration. This dynamic is not present in the market for
roughly fungible goods and services.
The schooling of our children is a thornier example: on one
hand, the education of a child is inexorably linked to economic
and political participation as an adult; on the other hand,
educational choices are powerful expressions of conscience.
Provided that exclusionary private schools do not take on a de
facto public identity or crowd out viable non-exclusionary
schooling alternatives in a particular community, however, a
government mandate of equal access to all private schools is too
steep a price to pay in terms of conscience.
Whether or not one agrees with my conclusions about the
wisdom of applying nondiscrimination law in these areas, the
point is that these are the sorts of observations and arguments
that lawmakers should be offering, not simply sweeping rhetoric
about the value of equality. The limits of conscience should not
" Allowing religious organizations to consider religion in hiring is important to
the relational dimension of conscience. Religion-based hiring exemptions do not
stack the deck in favor of religion but simply give religious organizations the same
ability to pursue their missions that secular organizations enjoy.
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be defined categorically. Lawmakers should not shut down the
moral marketplace by deciding that its continued operation is not
worthy of their respect; they should determine that its operation
is incompatible with securing goods that are foundational to
participation in our society.
Second, what sort of conscience-driven conversation has
preceded the law's intervention? Our nation struggled with the
question of race for centuries before the legal system made a
concerted effort to make racial equality a reality. By comparison,
a serious conversation on society's treatment of gays and lesbians
has only arisen in the last forty years, and the narrower question
of extending marriage to same-sex couples reached the headlines
only in the past decade or so. A requirement that employers offer
the same benefits to same-sex partners of employees as those
offered to spouses looks different in 2011 than in 1999. This is
not to minimize potential or perceived hardships as the law waits
for the social conversation to unfold; rather, the point is that the
space required for dissenting claims of conscience to operate may
change over time. Gauging the appropriate level of deference to
conscience is not a popularity contest, but the degree of deference
is a function, in part, of the opportunity for majority-defying
ideas to be lived out in the marketplace. Political actors will
disagree about how long the marketplace conversation should be
permitted to proceed; my point is simply that the inquiry
preceding state intervention should encompass not just questions
of how and why, but when.
Third, does the proposed legal intervention secure the
foundational premises of the common good while minimizing the
coercive impact on conscience? In other words, is the
intervention narrowly tailored to achieving the foundational
good? It is difficult to imagine how the Civil Rights Act could
have accomplished its objective-the dismantling of Jim Crow-
without such an aggressive stance. Back in 1944, Sterling Brown
had explained that, "however segregation may be rationalized, it
is essentially the denial of belonging."28 To be clear, "belonging"
as an abstract legal right is dangerous. Conscience draws
individuals into associations grounded on shared commitments,
and the vitality of conscience thus presumes the power to
28 James C. Cobb, Brown and Belonging, in THE BROWN DECISION, JIM CROW
AND SOUTHERN IDENTITY 56, 57 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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exclude. The wisdom of granting a legal entitlement to "belong"
depends on the object of the "belonging." Economic, political, and
educational opportunities are non-negotiable building blocks for
participation in American society. The Civil Rights Act went far
beyond these, targeting theaters, restaurants, and hotels. But
context is key. In the 1960s, African-Americans in the South
faced a society that was hard-wired for their subjugation and
exclusion. As Risa Goluboff explains, "Jim Crow existed because
every day, in ways momentous and quotidian, governments,
private institutions, and millions of individuals made decisions
about hiring, firing, consuming, recreating, governing, educating,
and serving that kept blacks out, down, and under." 9
Moreover, in terms of the moral contest over integration and
racial equality, the marketplace was not functional in any
meaningful sense. Voluntary integration was practically
impossible because, as the head of the Georgia Council on
Human Relations explained, "[no one wants to be a martyr or a
hero. Everyone wants to make his dollar without disturbance. "30
Even apart from moral claims, bottom-line considerations kept
business owners from breaking ranks. As a Mississippi district
attorney later commented, "The Civil Rights Act is probably the
best thing that ever happened to the South" because "[i]t took us
over what was inevitably coming, and it was going to come by
violence or bloodshed."3 1 It was practically impossible to
narrowly target employment discrimination in the Jim Crow
South because that was just one element of a tightly woven social
web of segregation. More precisely tailored legal intervention is
possible-and indeed, prudent-in nearly all of the hot-button
moral debates today.
Our concern for conscience must derive not simply from our
commitment to honor the freedom of individual citizens but from
our belief that individuals are most likely to flourish in a certain
type of society, one that is oriented to the common good through
the operation of a vibrant marketplace of moral ideals and
norms. It is not that associations will cease existing when the
state begins regulating the moral claims that they make upon
29 RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 7 (2007).
3o JASON SOKOL, THERE GOES MV EVERYTHING: WHITE SOUTHERNERS IN THE
AGE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 1945-1975, at 192 (2006) (quoting Frances Pauley) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
31 Id. at 195 (quoting Jesse Boyce Holleman) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and through their members, but they will cease serving their key
social function. Michael Walzer observes that "no group life of
intensity and value is possible if members of the various groups
are repeatedly driven into what must seem to them morally
degrading performances."3 2 The embrace of moral pluralism-not
only vis-A-vis individuals but also vis-A-vis the groups to which
they commit themselves-is a foundational genius of American
society. We must continue to reject the notion, as Walzer puts it,
that the "only obligations on which a democracy rests, and which
its citizens ought to respect, are obligations to itself.""
Nevertheless, freedom for Elane Photography may still
appear to have a tenuous relationship with the common good. At
a minimum, it is safe to say that state-coerced photography in
violation of conscience elicits nowhere near the amount of public
sympathy as does state-coerced military combat or the pledge of
allegiance to the flag. The Huguenins appear, to many, to be
misguided zealots who should seek another line of work or, at
best, unfortunate but unavoidable casualties in the noble
struggle for human equality. As noted civil rights scholar-and
current member of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission-Chai Feldblum remarked at the time, "[I]f you run
a wedding photography service, even if you don't like the fact
that those two ex-gays are getting married, you'd better have
someone on your staff who will take those pictures."34
Such responses derive from a superficial conception of
conscience, one that lacks the depth and breadth of conscience's
relational dimension. Suggesting that the Huguenins can honor
their consciences by keeping their moral beliefs out of the
marketplace ignores the external orientation of conscience,
discernible from its earliest invocations as moral belief applied to
conduct. Respecting conscience as an internalized set of beliefs
does not authentically respect conscience.
Similarly short sighted is the idea that the Huguenins can
avoid the problem by hiring an employee who is willing to shoot
events that their own moral convictions do not permit them to
shoot. This approach solves nothing unless we conceive of
32 MICHAEL WALZER, OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND
CITIZENSHIP 140 (1970).
33 Id.
' Talk of the Nation: Gay Rights Law Faces Legal, Religious Challenges (NPR
radio broadcast June 16, 2008) (quoting Chai Feldblum).
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conscience in individualist terms, as though its claims apply to
my own conduct and no further. In reality, conscience refers,
literally, to shared moral belief, and while not every claim of
conscience will actually be shared, such claims are, by their
nature, susceptible to sharing. As such, the Huguenins'
resistance to offering, through creative hiring, a "full service"
photography agency is not an imperialist expansion of
conscience's interior domain; it is a natural outgrowth of
conscience's relational dimension. Institutions do not possess a
conscience in any real sense, but they do embody distinct moral
identities that are shaped by their constituents' consciences.
When we preclude the cultivation and maintenance of such
institutional identities, it is not just moral pluralism that suffers;
it is the cause of conscience itself.
If we care about conscience, we have to care about the
Huguenins-in particular, about the state's punishment of their
refusal to photograph an event they find immoral. But in our
rights-soaked legal culture, it is easy to choose sides against the
state; less so against Vanessa Willock. We must remember,
though, that Vanessa Willock has become a functional stand-in
for the state. It is one thing for Willock's supporters to target the
hearts, minds, and wallets of their fellow citizens through
advocacy, protests, and boycotts; it is quite another to bring state
power down on the heads of those who have aggrieved them. In
the short term, the state can vindicate the conviction that gays
and lesbians should enjoy the same treatment as heterosexuals
in their attempt to secure goods and services in the marketplace.
In the long term, though, even if we applaud a particular moral
claim imposed by the state on dissenting consciences, each
instance paves the way for an increasingly top-down approach to
the common good. Fighting for the reins of state power to
determine which vision of the good will prevail in law and which
will be vanquished is no substitute for the day-to-day contests
over which visions of the good will find support and sustenance
among the citizenry, which visions will wither for lack of moral
persuasiveness, and which can flourish alongside each other.
Conscience, and the relational paths by which it forms the
common good, bear a legitimacy founded on human nature. This
legitimacy warrants the state's deference but should not require
its approval.
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